John A. Messec - Seattle WA, US Jonathan M. Rowlett - Sammamish WA, US Jeffrey P. Snover - Woodinville WA, US
Assignee:
Microsoft Corporation - Redmond WA
International Classification:
G06F 3/00 G06F 9/44 G06F 9/46 G06F 13/00
US Classification:
719316, 717103, 717108
Abstract:
Runtime polymorphism may be enabled with metadata that is usable for casting objects to casted objects. In an exemplary media implementation, processor-executable instructions cause operations including: discover at least one type of an object while in a runtime environment; and create a casted object from the object by casting the object to the casted object using metadata. An exemplary computing device implementation includes: one or more processors; and one or more media in operative communication therewith, the one or more media including: an object of a first type; metadata that is capable of being used to cast unknown objects in a runtime environment; and processor-executable instructions that, when executed, cause the one or more processors to perform an action including: casting the object of the first type to a casted object of a second type using the metadata in the runtime environment, the first type differing from the second type.
Context-Based Management User Interface Supporting Extensible Subtractive Filtering
Hilal Al-Hilali - Seattle WA, US Mark Sok-Man Hong - Bothwell WA, US Jonathan Marshall Rowlett - Sammamish WA, US Samuel Li - Bellevue WA, US John Anthony Messec - Seattle WA, US Abhishek Gulati - Seattle WA, US
Assignee:
Microsoft Corporation - Redmond WA
International Classification:
G06F 3/00 G06F 3/01
US Classification:
715762, 715763, 715765, 715788, 715825
Abstract:
A management user interface can be generated at run time via subtractive extensible context-based filtering. Definitions of user interface elements can include an indication of appropriate contexts for which the user interface elements are to be shown. Context factors can include application state, external state, surface or element definitions, or some combination thereof. The context-based filtering approach allows definition of user interface elements and user interface surfaces so that appearance of additional elements in the appropriate surfaces can be accomplished without programming. For example, a user interface surface definition can specify categories of user interface elements. At run time, those user interface elements of the category can be chosen for display. When new elements relating to the category are added, the new elements appear when the surface is rendered. Other features include heterogeneous type selection and exact number homogeneous type selection.
Scalable Retrieval Of Data Entries Using An Array Index Or A Secondary Key
Daniel Travison - Carnation WA, US John Messec - Seattle WA, US
Assignee:
Microsoft Corporation - Redmond WA
International Classification:
G06F 7/00
US Classification:
707100000
Abstract:
Example embodiments improve the lookup times and modification costs of indexing on a dynamically sorted list by using a combination of data structures to determine index values for secondary keys and vice versa. More specifically, exemplary embodiments provide a combination of a binary tree (e.g., a balanced binary tree) with a lookup table (e.g., linear dynamic hash table) to provide scalable retrieval of entries by either an array index or a secondary key. For example, given a key, a hash thereof returns a node placement within a balanced binary tree. This positioning can then be used at runtime to determine an index value for a data record, resulting in a near real-time lookup cost. Also note that modifications, such as reordering, insertions, and deletions, become a function of the nodes depth in the binary tree, rather than a linear function of number of records within the data array.
Daniel T. Travison - Carnation WA, US Jonathan A. White - Woodinville WA, US John A. Messec - Seattle WA, US
Assignee:
Microsoft Corporation - Redmond WA
International Classification:
G06F 7/02
US Classification:
714819
Abstract:
Apparatus and method for categorizing test failures are disclosed. In one embodiment, a data set of a current test failure is compared with the data sets of historical test failures to result in a set of correspondence values. The current test failure is categorized with respect to the historical test failures at least in part on the basis of the correspondence values.
Secure Management Of Operations On Protected Virtual Machines
- Redmond WA, US Yevgeniy Anatolievich Samsonov - Redmond WA, US Kinshumann - Redmond WA, US Samartha Chandrashekar - Redmond WA, US John Anthony Messec - Bellevue WA, US Mark Fishel Novak - Newcastle WA, US Christopher McCarron - Hartford CT, US Amitabh Prakash Tamhane - Redmond WA, US Qiang Wang - Bellevue WA, US David Matthew Kruse - Kirkland WA, US Nir Ben-Zvi - Bellevue WA, US Anders Bertil Vinberg - Kirkland WA, US
A virtual secure mode is enabled for a virtual machine operating in a computing environment that is associated with a plurality of different trust levels. First, a virtual secure mode image is loaded into one or more memory pages of a virtual memory space of the virtual machine. Then, the one or more memory pages of the virtual memory space are made inaccessible to one or more trust levels having a relatively lower trust level than a launching trust level that is used by a virtual secure mode loader to load the virtual secure mode image. A target virtual trust level is also enabled on a launching virtual processor for the virtual machine that is higher than the launching trust level.
Secure Creation Of Encrypted Virtual Machines From Encrypted Templates
- Redmond WA, US Nir Ben-Zvi - Bellevue WA, US John Anthony Messec - Bellevue WA, US Christopher McCarron - Hartford CT, US
International Classification:
G06F 21/57 G06F 9/44 G06F 9/455 H04L 29/06
Abstract:
Booting a machine in a secure fashion in a potentially unsecure environment. The method includes a target machine beginning a boot process. The method further includes the target machine determining that it needs provisioning data to continue booting. The target machine contacts a secure infrastructure to obtain the provisioning data. The target machine provides an identity claim that can be verified by the secure infrastructure. As a result of the secure infrastructure verifying the identity claim, the target machine receives a request from the secure infrastructure to establish a key sealed to the target machine. The target machine provides the established key to the secure infrastructure. The target machine receives the provisioning data from the secure infrastructure. The provisioning data is encrypted to the established key. The target machine decrypts the encrypted provisioning data, and uses the provisioning data to finish booting.
Secure Management Of Operations On Protected Virtual Machines
- Redmond WA, US Yevgeniy Anatolievich Samsonov - Redmond WA, US Samartha Chandrashekar - Redmond WA, US John Anthony Messec - Bellevue WA, US Mark Fishel Novak - Newcastle WA, US Christopher McCarron - Hartford CT, US Amitabh Prakash Tamhane - Redmond WA, US Qiang Wang - Bellevue WA, US David Matthew Kruse - Kirkland WA, US Nir Ben-Zvi - Bellevue WA, US Anders Bertil Vinberg - Kirkland WA, US
A virtual secure mode is enabled for a virtual machine operating in a computing environment that is associated with a plurality of different trust levels. First, a virtual secure mode image is loaded into one or more memory pages of a virtual memory space of the virtual machine. Then, the one or more memory pages of the virtual memory space are made inaccessible to one or more trust levels having a relatively lower trust level than a launching trust level that is used by a virtual secure mode loader to load the virtual secure mode image. A target virtual trust level is also enabled on a launching virtual processor for the virtual machine that is higher than the launching trust level.
Secure Creation Of Encrypted Virtual Machines From Encrypted Templates
- Redmond WA, US Nir Ben-Zvi - Bellevue WA, US John Anthony Messec - Bellevue WA, US Christopher McCarron - Hartford CT, US
International Classification:
G06F 21/57 G06F 9/455 G06F 9/44
Abstract:
Booting a machine in a secure fashion in a potentially unsecure environment. The method includes a target machine beginning a boot process. The method further includes the target machine determining that it needs provisioning data to continue booting. The target machine contacts a secure infrastructure to obtain the provisioning data. The target machine provides an identity claim that can be verified by the secure infrastructure. As a result of the secure infrastructure verifying the identity claim, the target machine receives a request from the secure infrastructure to establish a key sealed to the target machine. The target machine provides the established key to the secure infrastructure. The target machine receives the provisioning data from the secure infrastructure. The provisioning data is encrypted to the established key. The target machine decrypts the encrypted provisioning data, and uses the provisioning data to finish booting.
Microsoft Mar 1, 2012 - May 2015
Senior Technical Program Manager
Tss Holdings Oct 2007 - Feb 2009
Co-Founder
Education:
Texas Tech University 1993 - 1996
Bachelors, Bachelor of Science, Computer Science
Texas A&M University 1989 - 1991
Skills:
Cloud Computing Program Management Enterprise Software Agile Methodologies Software Development Software Project Management Software As A Service Scalability Enterprise Architecture Microsoft Azure
John Messec 1989 graduate of Pearsall High School in Pearsall, TX is on Classmates.com. See pictures, plan your class reunion and get caught up with John and other high school ...
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Lived:
Duvall, Wa Seattle, Wa Redmond, Wa Sammamish, Wa Buenos Aires, Argentina Florence, Italy Colorado Springs, Co Valley Ranch, Tx Lubbock, Tx Amarillo, Tx College Station, Tx Moore, Tx Hearne, Tx
Work:
Self - Software Engineer Microsoft Corp - Program Manager (1999-2010)
Education:
Pearsall High School, Texas Tech University - Computer Science
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