Ryan N Ware

US Patent:

8453236, May 28, 2013

Filed:

Sep 3, 2009

Appl. No.:

12/553797

Inventors:

Jean-Pierre Seifert - Hillsboro OR, US
Ryan R. Ware - Beaverton OR, US

Assignee:

Intel Corporation - Santa Clara CA

International Classification:

G06F 21/00

US Classification:

726 22, 713164

Abstract:

Methods, software/firmware and apparatus for implementing a tamper-aware virtual trusted platform module (TPM). Under the method, respective threads comprising a virtual TPM thread and a security-patrol threads are executed on a host processor. In one embodiment, the host processor is a multi-threaded processor having multiple logical processors, and the respective threads are executed on different logical processors. While the virtual TPM thread is used to perform various TPM functions, the security-patrol thread monitors for physical attacks on the processor by implementing various numerical calculation loops, wherein an erroneous calculation is indicative of a physical attack. In response to detection of such an attack, various actions can be taken in view of one or more predefined security policies, such as logging the event, shutting down the platform and/or informing a remote management entity.

US Patent:

20070006306, Jan 4, 2007

Filed:

Jun 30, 2005

Appl. No.:

11/173776

Inventors:

Jean-Pierre Seifert - Hillsboro OR, US
Ryan Ware - Beaverton OR, US

International Classification:

G06F 12/14

US Classification:

726022000

Abstract:

Methods, software/firmware and apparatus for implementing a tamper-aware virtual trusted platform module (TPM). Under the method, respective threads comprising a virtual TPM thread and a security-patrol threads are executed on a host processor. In one embodiment, the host processor is a multi-threaded processor having multiple logical processors, and the respective threads are executed on different logical processors. While the virtual TPM thread is used to perform various TPM functions, the security-patrol thread monitors for physical attacks on the processor by implementing various numerical calculation loops, wherein an erroneous calculation is indicative of a physical attack. In response to detection of such an attack, various actions can be taken in view of one or more predefined security policies, such as logging the event, shutting down the platform and/or informing a remote management entity.